Net 10-year effect $0B  
Annual, % of GDP +0.00% vs 3-4% target
Debt-to-GDP in 2056 CBO baseline: 175%
Your annual change vs current
Levers selected 0 / 106  

Budget balancer

106 policy levers across revenue, spending, and structural reforms. Defaults reflect the framework's recommendation. Set your household details below to also see what each lever would cost or save you personally.

Your household Married filing jointly · $120,000 wages · 2 kids · CA Click to edit
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Personal-impact estimates are illustrative and additive (lever-by-lever). They cover individual income tax, capital gains, payroll, broad consumption taxes (VAT, carbon, fuel), and direct transfers. They do NOT model itemized-deduction reforms, AMT, state taxes, or indirect effects on wages and prices. Levers without a direct personal effect display "indirect" or "—".

Load a preset:
Revenue 0 of 42 on $0B

Raising additional federal revenue. Drawn from CBO Options for Reducing the Deficit and JCT tax expenditure tables.

Individual income tax

Raise top 4 income tax brackets by 1 point

+$300B +0.078% of GDP / yr

Increase the four highest individual income tax brackets by one percentage point each. Applies above the 24% bracket threshold.

Left
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

A modest rate increase confined to the top four marginal brackets affects roughly the top 5 percent of filers. The framework prefers a deeper change (45 to 50 percent top rate plus new top brackets at the 0.5, 0.1, and 0.01 percent thresholds), but this is the milder CBO option closer to the Biden-era proposals.

Counter-argument

Critics argue that even small top-rate increases reduce investment incentives and encourage income shifting to capital. The empirical literature finds the behavioral response on the intensive margin (hours worked, business formation) to be modest at this scale, though the literature on tax avoidance and income shifting is contested.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034 (re-estimated to 2026-2035 by CRFB)

Raise all income tax brackets by 1 point

+$1.20T +0.312% of GDP / yr

Increase every marginal individual income tax rate by one percentage point.

Center
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

An across-the-board increase distributes the revenue burden across the entire income distribution. This is broadly proportional to current liabilities and avoids the political concentration of cost on top earners.

Counter-argument

Raising rates on middle-income households is politically very difficult and is widely viewed as inconsistent with the contemporary norm that no household earning less than $400,000 should pay higher federal taxes. It also produces a larger drag on consumer spending than top-end alternatives.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Top marginal rate to 45 percent with new top brackets

+$1.90T +0.494% of GDP / yr

Raise the top marginal rate from 37 to 45 percent and add additional brackets at the top 0.5 percent, top 0.1 percent, and top 0.01 percent income thresholds.

In framework Left Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The framework argues that effective rates on the top 1 percent have fallen from roughly 40 to 45 percent in earlier decades to about 25 to 30 percent today, while wealth at the top has grown substantially. New brackets above the existing top bracket are a more progressive instrument than raising all top brackets uniformly because the share of income concentrated in the top 0.1 percent has roughly doubled since 1980.

Counter-argument

Capital flight, behavioral responses, and the political precariousness of high statutory rates argue against this design. The framework's own response is that GloBE coordination and historical evidence both constrain the magnitude of behavioral response, but the empirical case is not settled.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on framework Chapter 24, calibrated to CBO surtax option

1 percent surtax on AGI above $100K/$200K married

+$560B +0.145% of GDP / yr

Add a one percent surtax on adjusted gross income above $100,000 for single filers and $200,000 for joint filers.

Left
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

A surtax operates on adjusted gross income rather than taxable income, so it cannot be reduced through itemized deductions or many tax credits. This makes it harder to plan around than a marginal rate increase.

Counter-argument

Surtaxes layered onto existing rate schedules add complexity without simplification. They also affect a much larger share of households than rate increases on just the top bracket.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Capital taxation

Tax carried interest as ordinary income

+$15B +0.004% of GDP / yr

Treat the share of investment fund profits paid to fund managers as ordinary compensation rather than long-term capital gain.

In framework Center
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Carried interest is the performance fee paid to private equity, venture, and hedge fund managers. Under current law it is treated as a capital gain even though it functions economically as labor compensation. Both major party platforms have at various times endorsed reform.

Counter-argument

The private equity industry argues that carried interest represents real risk-bearing, since managers stand to lose accumulated promote on poor fund performance. Critics of reform also note that the revenue is small relative to other capital-tax options.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Realize capital gains at death (eliminate step-up basis)

+$570B +0.148% of GDP / yr

Treat death as a realization event for unrealized capital gains, with exemptions for the first portion of accrued gains and provisions for family business or farm transfers.

In framework Left
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Under current law, assets passed at death receive a stepped-up basis equal to fair market value, which permanently exempts accumulated gains from income tax. The framework views this as one of the largest loopholes in the code, concentrated heavily in the top 1 percent.

Counter-argument

Family businesses and farms can face liquidity stress if heirs owe tax on inherited illiquid assets. The framework's proposal includes installment payment provisions to address this, but the political coalition opposing reform has historically defeated similar proposals.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Carryover basis at death (no realization event)

+$230B +0.060% of GDP / yr

Heirs inherit the decedent's basis rather than a stepped-up basis. Capital gains tax is deferred until the heir sells the asset.

Center
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

A milder alternative to realization at death. It does not produce immediate liquidity stress but eventually subjects the appreciation to taxation when the heir disposes of the asset. Canada uses a realization model; several European systems use carryover.

Counter-argument

Tracking basis across generations is administratively complex and historically failed when the United States attempted it in 1976. The framework prefers realization at death precisely because it cuts that recordkeeping problem.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Capital gains as ordinary income above $1M AGI

+$400B +0.104% of GDP / yr

Tax long-term capital gains and qualified dividends at ordinary income rates for taxpayers with adjusted gross income above $1 million.

In framework Left Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Currently long-term capital gains and qualified dividends are taxed at 0, 15, or 20 percent, with an additional 3.8 percent Net Investment Income Tax above moderate thresholds. The framework retains preferential rates for typical taxpayers but eliminates them above $1 million in AGI, on the argument that the preferential rate is doing labor-versus-capital arbitrage rather than encouraging saving at the top.

Counter-argument

Higher rates on realizations produce lock-in: holders defer sales to avoid the tax, which can reduce revenue and distort portfolios. Empirical estimates of the elasticity of realizations to the rate vary, but most studies find a meaningful response that limits how much revenue can be raised.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on framework Chapter 24 and JCT scoring of similar proposals

Expand Net Investment Income Tax to active passthrough income

+$440B +0.114% of GDP / yr

Apply the 3.8 percent NIIT to active business income from passthrough entities that currently escapes both the NIIT and self-employment payroll tax.

In framework Center
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

A significant slice of income from S corporations and partnerships is exempt from both Medicare payroll tax and the NIIT because it is treated as neither wages nor passive investment income. The framework views this as a gap that allows high earners to avoid the 3.8 percent Medicare surtax that applies to wages and to investment income alike.

Counter-argument

Passthrough income reflects active labor by owner-operators in many small businesses; subjecting it to NIIT effectively imposes a Medicare surtax on small business income. Limits to small operators or income thresholds would target the abuse without affecting Main Street.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Raise long-term capital gains rates by 2 points

+$110B +0.029% of GDP / yr

Raise the three long-term capital gains and qualified dividend brackets from 0/15/20 percent to 2/17/22 percent.

Center
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

A modest across-the-board increase. Less concentrated than the framework's $1M-AGI threshold and less ambitious than full ordinary-income treatment.

Counter-argument

Higher rates on capital can reduce investment at the margin. Most economists view the effect as modest but nontrivial.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Itemized deductions

Eliminate all itemized deductions

+$3.70T +0.961% of GDP / yr

Repeal itemized deductions in their entirety. All filers would use the standard deduction.

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Itemized deductions are concentrated heavily in the top income deciles after the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act raised the standard deduction. Elimination would be the single largest revenue option in the CBO catalog.

Counter-argument

Charitable, mortgage interest, and state and local tax deductions have politically organized constituencies. Eliminating them produces large concentrated losses in narrow groups (housing, philanthropy, high-tax states) and modest broad gains. Most tax reformers favor capping rather than eliminating.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Cap value of itemized deductions at 15 percent

+$2.00T +0.519% of GDP / yr

Limit the value of each dollar of itemized deduction to 15 cents, regardless of the taxpayer's marginal rate.

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

An idea associated with the Obama administration and Martin Feldstein. The current marginal-rate-based value of deductions gives a 37-cent subsidy per dollar to top-bracket filers and a 12-cent subsidy to lower-bracket filers. A flat 15-cent value treats taxpayers more equally.

Counter-argument

The cap functions like a backdoor rate increase on the wealthy that does not respect the marginal-rate structure. Critics also argue that charitable giving is sensitive to the deduction value and that a 15-percent floor (rather than 37 percent) materially reduces giving.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Cap mortgage interest deduction at $500K principal

+$70B +0.018% of GDP / yr

Limit the mortgage interest deduction to the first $500,000 of mortgage principal, down from the current $750,000 limit, indexed for inflation.

In framework Non-ideological Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Most economists across the spectrum view the mortgage interest deduction as poorly targeted: it disproportionately benefits high-income filers in expensive metros, encourages larger and more leveraged homes, and contributes to housing price inflation. The framework argues for further restriction in the context of broader housing supply reform.

Counter-argument

Realtors and homebuilders argue any reduction depresses home prices. The empirical evidence is that price effects are concentrated in expensive markets where the cap binds, while the broader housing market is largely unaffected.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on JCT scoring of similar caps and framework Chapter 26

Charitable deduction with 2 percent of AGI floor

+$350B +0.091% of GDP / yr

Allow charitable contributions to be deducted only to the extent they exceed 2 percent of adjusted gross income.

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

A floor targets the deduction toward giving that is above the baseline a taxpayer would have made regardless of the subsidy. Several major tax-reform commissions have recommended this design.

Counter-argument

Empirical work on giving elasticity is mixed; the floor may reduce total giving by more than the revenue gained. Religious and arts organizations are the typical opponents.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Tax expenditures

Sunset all tax expenditures

+$200B +0.052% of GDP / yr

Apply mandatory expiration dates to all federal tax expenditures, requiring affirmative congressional reauthorization on a rolling basis.

In framework Non-ideological Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Tax expenditures total roughly $1.5 trillion annually in foregone revenue, more than the combined federal cost of Medicare and Medicaid. The sunset mechanism does not directly raise revenue but creates institutional pressure to retire low-value preferences. The revenue estimate is an illustrative figure for the share that would not be extended.

Counter-argument

Sunsets create constant 'extender' political battles and inject uncertainty into long-term business planning. The history of the temporary R&D credit is the canonical example: it was 'temporary' for over three decades.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on framework Chapter 26 procedural design

Cap employer health insurance exclusion at 50th percentile

+$1.20T +0.312% of GDP / yr

Limit the income and payroll tax exclusion for employer-provided health insurance to plans priced at or below the 50th percentile of premiums.

In framework Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The exclusion of employer-provided health insurance from income and payroll tax is the single largest federal tax expenditure, worth several hundred billion dollars annually. It is regressive and feeds healthcare cost inflation by subsidizing more generous plans for higher earners. Most major tax reform proposals have included a cap.

Counter-argument

Unions and benefits managers strongly oppose any 'Cadillac tax' equivalent. The Affordable Care Act's Cadillac tax was repeatedly delayed and eventually repealed. The political coalition for the exclusion is broad and durable.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Cap employer health insurance exclusion at 75th percentile

+$630B +0.164% of GDP / yr

Milder version of the exclusion cap, set at the 75th percentile of premiums.

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Affects fewer households than the 50th-percentile cap. A common compromise position.

Counter-argument

Same as the 50th-percentile version, scaled down.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Lower 401(k) and IRA contribution limits

+$195B +0.051% of GDP / yr

Reduce maximum 401(k) contributions from $23,000 to $20,000, further limit IRA contributions, and restrict IRA-to-Roth conversions for high earners.

Left
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The retirement contribution exclusion is the second largest tax expenditure after employer health. It is highly concentrated in the top quintile, since lower earners cannot afford to contribute the maximum and benefit less from deferral.

Counter-argument

Critics across the political spectrum argue retirement saving is already insufficient and that contribution limit cuts move in the wrong direction. The framework's broader negative-income-tax approach handles retirement income for low earners via the transfer system, but politically retirement saving is a sacred category.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Estate and wealth

Lower estate tax exemption to $3.5M/$7M and raise rates

+$350B +0.091% of GDP / yr

Reduce the estate tax exemption from the current $13.6 million per person to $3.5 million per person ($7 million for couples), and raise progressive rates to as high as 50 to 60 percent for the largest estates.

In framework Left Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The estate tax applies to roughly 0.1 percent of estates under current law, far below the historical norm. Returning to pre-2001 thresholds and raising top rates targets concentrated wealth at death. The framework also recommends anti-avoidance provisions (limits on valuation discounts, GRATs, IDGTs).

Counter-argument

Family businesses and farms can face liquidity stress; the framework provides installment payment provisions. The 'double taxation' argument (income already taxed once) is rhetorically powerful but does not survive scrutiny: most estate value is unrealized capital gain that was never taxed.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on framework Chapter 24 and JCT scoring of similar proposals

Corporate income tax

Raise corporate income tax rate to 28 percent

+$980B +0.254% of GDP / yr

Increase the federal corporate income tax rate from 21 to 28 percent.

In framework Left Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The framework notes corporate tax revenue has fallen to roughly 1.5 percent of GDP, far below the historical norm of 3 to 4 percent, despite strong corporate profitability. The 28 percent rate remains internationally competitive under the OECD GloBE 15 percent floor, which constrains a race to the bottom.

Counter-argument

Corporate tax incidence is contested. Some studies find labor bears a significant share through reduced wages; others find capital bears most of the burden. Even partial labor incidence makes the corporate tax less progressive than its statutory image suggests.

Source: Illustrative estimate calibrated to CBO 1-point option ($140B) and framework Chapter 25

Strengthen corporate book-income AMT to 21 percent

+$250B +0.065% of GDP / yr

Raise the corporate alternative minimum tax on book income from 15 to 21 percent and broaden coverage.

In framework Left Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act established a 15 percent book-income AMT on the largest corporations. The framework strengthens this by matching the statutory corporate rate. This narrows the gap between income reported to shareholders and income reported to the IRS.

Counter-argument

Book-tax differences reflect legitimate timing differences and economic concepts (depreciation, R&D capitalization) that diverge from financial accounting. Using book income for tax purposes effectively cedes part of the tax base definition to FASB.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on framework Chapter 25 and 2022 IRA AMT scoring

Tax foreign earnings at full corporate rate

+$345B +0.090% of GDP / yr

Eliminate the GILTI and BEAT preferential rates and tax foreign earnings of US corporations at the full statutory corporate rate.

In framework Left
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, foreign income of US corporations faces a reduced rate via the GILTI regime. The framework views this as a continuing source of base erosion and recommends harmonizing with the OECD GloBE framework.

Counter-argument

Higher foreign-income rates risk corporate inversions and competitive disadvantage. GloBE's 15 percent floor partially mitigates the risk but does not eliminate it for the gap between 15 and 21 percent.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Amortize half of advertising costs over 5 years

+$85B +0.022% of GDP / yr

Require half of corporate advertising expenditures to be capitalized and amortized over 5 years rather than fully deducted in the year incurred.

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Advertising creates a long-lived asset (brand, customer base) that current tax rules treat as a one-period expense. Capitalizing a portion aligns tax with economic reality.

Counter-argument

Critics argue this is a hidden tax on brand-building and would disadvantage consumer-facing firms. Most peer countries follow the current US treatment.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Raise stock buyback excise tax to 4 percent

+$165B +0.043% of GDP / yr

Increase the excise tax on corporate stock buybacks from 1 to 4 percent (dividend-tax-neutral level).

In framework Left Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The 2022 IRA established a 1 percent excise tax on corporate buybacks. The framework raises it to roughly the level at which the after-tax return on a buyback equals that of a comparable dividend, eliminating the tax preference that has helped drive growth in buyback volume.

Counter-argument

Buybacks return capital to shareholders efficiently and let investors reallocate to higher-return uses. A higher buyback tax may shift firms toward dividends, which are themselves taxed; whether the net effect on shareholder behavior is significant is contested.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on JCT scoring of similar proposals

Repeal Low-Income Housing Tax Credit

+$70B +0.018% of GDP / yr

Repeal the LIHTC program, which provides credits to investors in qualifying low-income rental housing.

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The LIHTC is the largest federal subsidy for affordable housing construction. Critics across the political spectrum argue it produces less housing per dollar than direct subsidy or zoning reform.

Counter-argument

Affordable housing advocates argue that repeal without an alternative would dramatically reduce affordable supply. The framework prefers zoning reform plus direct vouchers (consolidated into the NIT) over LIHTC, but the political coalition for LIHTC is strong.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

New taxes

5 percent VAT on a broad base

+$3.50T +0.909% of GDP / yr

Impose a five percent value-added tax with a broad base covering most goods and services.

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Every other wealthy democracy uses a VAT or equivalent broad consumption tax. The United States is the major outlier. A broad-base 5 percent VAT would raise roughly 0.9 percent of GDP annually with relatively low compliance costs once established.

Counter-argument

VATs are regressive in incidence: lower-income households spend a larger share of income on taxable consumption. Most peer democracies pair a VAT with refundable credits or generous social spending to offset. The political coalition for a VAT has historically failed because the left fears regressivity and the right fears it becomes a 'money machine' for government expansion.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

5 percent VAT on a narrow base

+$2.30T +0.597% of GDP / yr

Impose a five percent VAT with a narrow base that exempts food, housing, healthcare, and education.

Center
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

A narrow-base VAT exempts the categories most heavily weighted in low-income household budgets. This reduces regressivity at the cost of revenue and administrative complexity.

Counter-argument

Narrow-base VATs are notoriously complex (line-drawing on which foods, which medical products, etc.) and create more avoidance opportunities than broad-base versions. Most public finance economists prefer a broad-base VAT paired with cash transfers.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Carbon tax at $25 per ton, 5 percent annual growth

+$960B +0.249% of GDP / yr

Impose a carbon tax of $25 per metric ton of CO2-equivalent, increasing at 5 percent annually in real terms.

In framework Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The framework references a carbon dividend (a carbon tax with revenue rebated to households) as one of the new revenue sources. Economists from both major parties have endorsed carbon pricing for decades; the political coalition has not held. A carbon tax dominates regulatory approaches on welfare grounds.

Counter-argument

Carbon taxes are regressive in initial incidence and politically unstable: France's gilets jaunes movement was triggered by a carbon tax increase. Pairing with a dividend or rebate reduces regressivity but adds administrative complexity. Industry opposition is strong in fossil fuel and energy-intensive sectors.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

0.01 percent financial transaction tax

+$340B +0.088% of GDP / yr

Impose a one-basis-point tax on the value of each stock trade and derivatives transaction.

In framework Left
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

An FTT raises revenue from financial market activity and may reduce socially wasteful high-frequency trading. The United Kingdom has a 0.5 percent stamp duty on UK shares; the EU has been debating an FTT for over a decade.

Counter-argument

FTTs can drive transactions offshore and reduce market liquidity. The Swedish 1984 FTT was widely viewed as a failure: it shifted Stockholm trading to London. Modern proposals at lower rates (1 to 5 basis points) appear less distortionary, but the literature is contested.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

AI windfall tax dedicated to sovereign wealth fund

+$500B +0.130% of GDP / yr

Multi-tier corporate income tax on returns above a threshold calibrated to normal returns on capital, with rates rising to 50-70 percent on the most extraordinary returns. Revenue dedicated to the National Heritage Fund.

In framework Left Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The framework argues that the most extraordinary economic returns from AI deployment will likely be concentrated in a few firms and that historic capture mechanisms (antitrust, ordinary corporate tax) will be insufficient. A windfall tax modeled loosely on the EU 2022 energy windfall tax and indexed to capital investment captures returns not attributable to specific firm investment. Revenue dedicated to the sovereign wealth fund prevents general-fund absorption.

Counter-argument

Windfall taxes are administratively difficult: defining 'normal returns' is contested, and firms have strong incentives to characterize AI-attributable income as something else. Capital flight risk is real, though GloBE coordination constrains it. The historical record on windfall taxes (1970s US oil) is mixed.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on framework Chapter 16

Excise taxes

Standardize and raise alcohol excise taxes

+$105B +0.027% of GDP / yr

Equalize federal alcohol taxes across beverage types at $16 per proof gallon and index for inflation.

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Federal alcohol taxes have been eroded by inflation since 1991 and vary across beer, wine, and spirits in ways unrelated to alcohol content. Equalization and indexing addresses both problems.

Counter-argument

Alcohol taxes are regressive. The public health case for higher taxes (drunk driving, alcohol-related disease) is strong; the political coalition is weak.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Raise tobacco taxes by 50 percent

+$50B +0.013% of GDP / yr

Increase federal tobacco taxes by 50 percent and equalize across product categories.

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Tobacco taxes are the most effective documented public health intervention. The marginal smoker is more price-elastic than the inframarginal smoker, so taxes both raise revenue and reduce consumption.

Counter-argument

Tobacco taxes are sharply regressive and fall on a population that is increasingly low-income. Public health benefits accrue to the same population, but the regressivity is real.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Raise motor fuel taxes by 15 cents and index

+$215B +0.056% of GDP / yr

Increase federal gasoline and diesel taxes by 15 cents per gallon and index for inflation.

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The federal gas tax has been 18.4 cents since 1993 and is the principal funding source for the Highway Trust Fund. Real value has eroded substantially. An increase plus indexing restores the fund's purchasing power and reduces the need for general-fund transfers.

Counter-argument

Vehicle electrification means the gas tax is a shrinking base. A vehicle-miles-traveled tax would be more durable but is politically and administratively harder. A fuel tax increase is a transition revenue source, not a long-run solution.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Tax administration

Expand IRS enforcement on high-income filers

+$250B +0.065% of GDP / yr

Increase IRS enforcement appropriations targeted at returns over $400,000 in AGI and complex business returns.

In framework Non-ideological Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The framework cites Treasury estimates of $5 to $10 in additional revenue per dollar of high-income enforcement spending. Audit rates on returns over $1 million fell from above 7 percent in 2011 to under 2 percent by 2019. The Inflation Reduction Act provided enforcement funding that has since been repeatedly clawed back.

Counter-argument

Critics worry about IRS overreach into middle-income filers and view the agency as politically captured. The framework targets the funding specifically at high-income and complex returns, but legislative drafting has not always held that limit in practice.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on Treasury and CBO scoring of similar IRA provisions

Social Security

Eliminate Social Security payroll tax cap above $250K

+$1.60T +0.416% of GDP / yr

Apply the 12.4 percent Social Security payroll tax to wages above $250,000 (no upper limit), without crediting additional benefits.

In framework Left
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Currently the 12.4 percent payroll tax applies only to the first $176,100 of wages, with a 'donut hole' above the cap. This option fills the donut above $250K, raising substantial revenue while exempting the upper-middle class. Closes roughly 70 percent of the 75-year Social Security solvency gap.

Counter-argument

Critics argue this severs the contributory link in Social Security: contributions above the cap do not produce additional benefits, converting the program from social insurance to redistribution. Defenders respond that the benefit formula is already progressive and the program is partially redistributive by design.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Raise Social Security taxable maximum to cover 90 percent of wages

+$800B +0.208% of GDP / yr

Raise the taxable maximum to the level that captures 90 percent of all covered wages (about $305,000 in 2024), with credited benefits.

Center
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The 1983 amendments set the cap to cover 90 percent of wages, but wage growth at the top has eroded coverage to roughly 82 percent today. Restoring the historical 90 percent target raises substantial revenue and credits the additional contributions toward benefits.

Counter-argument

A milder option than the framework's preferred approach. Trades off less revenue for retained contributory linkage.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Cover newly hired state and local workers under Social Security

+$180B +0.047% of GDP / yr

Mandate Social Security coverage for all new state and local government employees in states that currently offer alternatives.

Center
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Roughly a quarter of state and local workers (mostly in 15 states) are outside Social Security and covered by state-specific plans. Universal coverage simplifies benefit calculations and modestly improves solvency.

Counter-argument

State and local plans often pay substantially better than Social Security. Forced inclusion is opposed by affected state pension systems and worker representatives.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Medicare

Raise Hospital Insurance payroll tax by 0.5 points

+$675B +0.175% of GDP / yr

Increase the 2.9 percent Hospital Insurance (Medicare Part A) payroll tax by 0.5 percentage points.

Center Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The HI payroll tax directly funds Medicare Part A. A 0.5-point increase fully closes the long-term HI trust fund gap on its own.

Counter-argument

Increasing the HI tax raises labor costs broadly. The framework prefers progressive revenue options to flat payroll tax increases.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on CBO 0.1-point option ($135B)

Federal workforce

Increase federal civilian employee retirement contributions

+$40B +0.010% of GDP / yr

Raise the contribution rate for federal civilian employees in the Federal Employees Retirement System to 4.4 percent of salary for all employees (currently only those hired in 2014 or later pay this rate).

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Civilian federal employees hired before 2014 pay much lower retirement contributions than newer hires. Equalization raises modest revenue and addresses the cohort inconsistency.

Counter-argument

Federal employee unions oppose any contribution increase, particularly on workers hired under prior terms.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Other revenue

Eliminate income tax exemption for VA disability payments

+$255B +0.066% of GDP / yr

Subject VA disability compensation to ordinary income tax, with potential offsets through other benefits or refundable credits.

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

VA disability compensation is the largest category of income statutorily exempt from federal income tax. Critics view this as horizontally inequitable to wage earners in comparable circumstances.

Counter-argument

Veterans' organizations strongly oppose. Any politically viable version would need to be paired with benefits expansion to hold harmless current beneficiaries, which substantially reduces the net revenue.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Eliminate Head of Household filing status

+$215B +0.056% of GDP / yr

Require all filers currently using Head of Household status to file as single.

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Head of Household provides preferential brackets and standard deduction for unmarried filers with dependents. Critics argue it adds complexity for modest revenue impact.

Counter-argument

Single parents would face significantly higher tax liability. This is one of the few major tax provisions specifically benefiting single-parent households and removing it without an offsetting credit would be heavily regressive within that population.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Eliminate higher education tax credits

+$130B +0.034% of GDP / yr

Repeal the American Opportunity Tax Credit and Lifetime Learning Tax Credit.

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Empirical evidence finds higher-education tax credits do not substantially increase enrollment and primarily transfer money to households that would have attended college anyway. Most public finance economists view them as ineffective.

Counter-argument

Middle-class families view these credits as significant help with tuition. Repeal would be politically painful even if economically defensible.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Spending 0 of 38 on $0B

Reductions or restructuring of federal spending. Sources include CBO Options across Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, defense, and discretionary categories.

Social Security

Use chained CPI for Social Security COLA

+$260B +0.068% of GDP / yr

Replace the current CPI-W index used for Social Security cost-of-living adjustments with the chained CPI, which captures consumer substitution and produces slightly lower annual adjustments.

In framework Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Chained CPI grows about 0.25 percentage points more slowly per year than CPI-W. Most economists view it as a more accurate measure of inflation. Closes roughly 10 percent of the 75-year Social Security solvency gap.

Counter-argument

Critics argue chained CPI does not reflect the consumption basket of retirees, who spend more on healthcare and less on substitutable goods. An alternative experimental CPI-E (for elderly) grows slightly faster than CPI-W. The Bureau of Labor Statistics has been developing CPI-E but it is not yet authoritative.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Raise Social Security full retirement age to 70

+$150B +0.039% of GDP / yr

Raise the full retirement age by 2 months per year from the current 67, reaching 70 by the late 2050s. Applies only to workers reaching age 60 after enactment.

In framework Right
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Life expectancy at age 65 has risen by roughly 5 years since the program's establishment. Younger workers have decades to adjust planning. The framework applies the increase only to cohorts with enough notice. Closes roughly 35 percent of the 75-year solvency gap.

Counter-argument

Life expectancy gains have been highly unequal. Low-income workers in physically demanding jobs have seen little gain since the 1980s, and they tend to claim early. A retirement age increase is regressive in incidence. The framework's response is that early-retirement options at age 62 remain available with the actuarial reduction unchanged.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Reduce benefit formula factors for top half of earners

+$280B +0.073% of GDP / yr

Phase down the 32 percent and 15 percent benefit formula factors for the top half of new beneficiaries to 10 and 5 percent (the Simpson-Bowles design).

In framework Center
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Social Security's benefit formula returns 90 percent of the first dollars of average indexed monthly earnings, 32 percent of the next tier, and 15 percent above. Reducing the upper tiers for high earners while preserving the 90 percent low-earner factor makes the program more progressive. Closes roughly 40 percent of the 75-year solvency gap.

Counter-argument

Critics argue this further severs the contributory link and converts Social Security into a means-tested program politically vulnerable to cuts. Defenders respond that the formula is already progressive.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Tighten SSDI recency-of-work requirement

+$70B +0.018% of GDP / yr

Require SSDI applicants to have worked 4 of the last 6 years (rather than 5 of the last 10) before applying.

Right
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The current recency rule allows workers who have been out of the labor force for years to apply. A stricter rule targets benefits more closely toward workers with recent labor market attachment.

Counter-argument

Critics argue this excludes workers who become disabled after exiting the workforce (e.g., to care for family) or who have intermittent attachment. The framework prefers other SSDI reforms over this one.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Medicare

Reduce Medicare Advantage benchmarks by 10 percent

+$615B +0.160% of GDP / yr

Reduce the formula benchmark that Medicare uses to pay private Medicare Advantage plans by 10 percent.

In framework Center
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Medicare pays MA plans more than the equivalent cost of traditional Medicare beneficiaries with similar characteristics. The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission has repeatedly recommended benchmark reductions. The framework treats this as a near-consensus reform.

Counter-argument

MA plans use the excess to fund supplemental benefits (vision, dental, gym memberships) that enrollees value. Benchmark cuts reduce these supplemental benefits. The framework's response is that the excess is captured partly as insurer profit and partly as benefits that less-generous public programs already cover for low-income enrollees.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Raise MA upcoding adjustment to 8 percent

+$200B +0.052% of GDP / yr

Increase the coding intensity adjustment that reduces MA payments to account for documented upcoding, from the current 5.9 percent to 8 percent.

In framework Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

MA plans systematically code their enrollees as sicker than they are to capture higher risk-adjusted payments. The current 5.9 percent statutory adjustment is widely viewed as insufficient.

Counter-argument

MA plans argue their coding reflects more thorough documentation, not gaming. Empirical evidence (CMS audits, RAND studies) generally finds the coding gap is real.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Raise MA upcoding adjustment to 20 percent

+$1.32T +0.343% of GDP / yr

Aggressive version of the upcoding fix, raising the adjustment to 20 percent. Roughly closes the entire long-term Hospital Insurance trust fund gap.

Left
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

An aggressive version of upcoding correction. Likely produces significant disruption to the MA plan market.

Counter-argument

Likely to cause MA plan exits, reducing enrollee choice in some markets.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Site-neutral Medicare payments for most outpatient services

+$180B +0.047% of GDP / yr

Pay the same Medicare rate for outpatient services regardless of whether they are delivered in a hospital outpatient department or a freestanding physician office.

In framework Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Medicare currently pays hospital outpatient departments substantially more than freestanding offices for identical services. This has driven hospital acquisition of physician practices, raising prices across both Medicare and private insurance. The framework views this as a near-consensus reform.

Counter-argument

Hospitals argue site-neutral payments eliminate cross-subsidization that supports unprofitable services (rural ER, trauma, teaching). The framework's response is that targeted federal support for genuinely necessary cross-subsidization is more efficient than allowing monopoly rents across all hospital outpatient services.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Expand Medicare drug price negotiation

+$500B +0.130% of GDP / yr

Eliminate the small-molecule disadvantage, expand the number of drugs negotiated annually, and authorize negotiation of launch prices for breakthrough therapies.

In framework Left Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act authorized Medicare to negotiate a limited number of drug prices each year. The framework expands the scope and pace of negotiation. Drug prices in the US are roughly 2-3 times peer-democracy prices.

Counter-argument

The pharmaceutical industry argues that lower prices reduce R&D investment and slow drug discovery. The empirical literature finds the relationship is real but not large at the proposed scale, and is concentrated in incremental therapies rather than breakthroughs.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on framework Chapter 3 and CBO scoring of IRA expansion options

Raise Part B premiums to 35 percent of costs

+$610B +0.158% of GDP / yr

Increase the share of Medicare Part B costs financed by beneficiary premiums from 25 to 35 percent.

Right
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Beneficiaries currently pay roughly 25 percent of Part B costs through premiums. Raising the share shifts costs from general revenue (taxpayers) to beneficiaries. The framework prefers income-related premium increases (Part B IRMAA expansion) over a general premium hike.

Counter-argument

Across-the-board premium increases are regressive within the beneficiary population. Low-income beneficiaries on Medicaid have premiums paid by Medicaid, but middle-income retirees face the full cost.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Expand income-related Medicare premiums

+$280B +0.073% of GDP / yr

Extend the income-related premium (IRMAA) structure to additional income brackets with steeper rates at higher income levels.

In framework Center Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Higher-income Medicare beneficiaries already pay higher Part B and D premiums. The framework expands the bracket structure to capture more high-income beneficiaries and raise rates at the top, distributing costs progressively while preserving Medicare's universal nature.

Counter-argument

Beneficiary advocates argue Medicare is earned insurance paid for through payroll taxes throughout the working life, not means-tested transfer. The framework views this as analytically incorrect (Part B and D are general-fund-financed) but politically real.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on framework Chapter 23 and CBO IRMAA options

Modernize Medicare cost-sharing with combined deductible and OOP cap

+$30B +0.008% of GDP / yr

Replace the separate Part A and Part B cost-sharing structures with a combined $850 deductible, 20 percent coinsurance, and $8,500 out-of-pocket maximum.

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Modernizes the 1965-vintage Medicare cost-sharing structure. The out-of-pocket maximum is a major benefit improvement for high-utilization beneficiaries; the modest deductible and coinsurance are small disincentives for low-value care.

Counter-argument

Modest savings relative to other Medicare options. Critics from the left argue any cost-sharing impedes appropriate care; from the right argue more substantial coinsurance is needed for utilization discipline.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Restrict Medigap first-dollar coverage

+$165B +0.043% of GDP / yr

Prohibit private Medigap supplemental plans from covering the first $850 of Medicare cost-sharing, or covering more than half of subsequent cost-sharing.

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Medigap plans that cover all Medicare cost-sharing effectively eliminate the price signal Medicare's cost-sharing was designed to create. Most analysts view this as inducing additional utilization that Medicare ultimately pays for.

Counter-argument

Medigap is widely held by middle-income retirees who value cost predictability. Restricting it shifts financial risk to beneficiaries.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Reduce 340B hospital drug reimbursements

+$85B +0.022% of GDP / yr

Cut Medicare drug reimbursements to 340B-program hospitals to 22.5 percent below average sales price.

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The 340B drug discount program lets qualifying hospitals buy drugs at deep discounts. Medicare reimburses at the higher non-discounted price, allowing hospitals to keep the spread. This has driven 340B expansion well beyond original safety-net intent.

Counter-argument

340B hospitals use the spread to fund services for low-income patients. The framework views the program as poorly targeted: many 340B hospitals serve relatively affluent patient mixes.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Medicaid

Cap state Medicaid growth per capita to inflation

+$1.10T +0.286% of GDP / yr

Establish a per-capita cap on federal Medicaid payments to states, growing at the rate of inflation (CPI-U).

Right
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Currently the federal share of Medicaid is open-ended, paying a fixed percentage of state expenditures with no ceiling. Capping growth at inflation reduces federal exposure to state spending decisions.

Counter-argument

Medical cost growth has historically exceeded CPI. An inflation cap effectively reduces federal Medicaid funding by 1-2 percentage points per year compounded. States would either cut beneficiaries, services, or rates, or absorb the costs. The framework prefers structural healthcare reform over Medicaid caps because the latter only shifts costs.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Cap state Medicaid growth per capita to inflation + 1 percent

+$750B +0.195% of GDP / yr

Per-capita federal Medicaid cap growing at inflation plus 1 percentage point.

Center
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

A milder version that accommodates some medical cost growth above general inflation.

Counter-argument

Same as the stricter version, scaled down.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Remove the 50 percent FMAP floor

+$600B +0.156% of GDP / yr

Eliminate the rule that the federal Medicaid match rate cannot fall below 50 percent. Affects states with the highest per-capita income.

Right
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The FMAP formula already accounts for state per-capita income, but a 50 percent floor protects wealthier states from very low matches. Removing the floor cuts federal funding to wealthier states.

Counter-argument

Affects a small number of high-income states (NY, NJ, CA, MA, others) significantly. These states have larger Medicaid populations than the simple per-capita-income measure suggests, partly because of high cost of living.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Reduce ACA expansion match to normal FMAP

+$650B +0.169% of GDP / yr

Reduce the 90 percent federal match for Medicaid ACA expansion population to each state's normal FMAP.

Right
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The ACA's enhanced 90 percent match for the expansion population (adults up to 138 percent of poverty) was a Medicaid funding cliff that incentivized expansion. Reducing the match would likely cause some states to drop expansion.

Counter-argument

Roughly 20 million Americans are covered through the ACA expansion. State withdrawal would produce significant coverage losses. The framework's preferred path is structural healthcare reform (Chapter 8) rather than rolling back coverage.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Ban Medicaid provider tax gimmicks

+$720B +0.187% of GDP / yr

Prohibit states from using provider taxes (so-called bed taxes) to inflate their federal match.

In framework Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

States tax Medicaid-providing hospitals and nursing homes, then use the tax revenue to pay those same providers higher Medicaid rates, capturing the federal match on what is effectively the providers' own money. The framework views this as a clear gaming of the matching system without policy justification.

Counter-argument

States and providers argue these arrangements support care delivery in rural and high-Medicaid areas. The framework's response is that direct federal subsidy for genuinely needed services is more efficient than allowing the gimmick to persist.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Impose Medicaid work requirements

+$140B +0.036% of GDP / yr

Require certain Medicaid beneficiaries to work, train, or volunteer at least 20 hours per week to maintain coverage.

Right
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Work requirements aim to encourage labor force participation and reduce caseload. Arkansas's 2018 experiment removed coverage from roughly 18,000 enrollees in 7 months before being struck down by federal courts.

Counter-argument

Empirical evidence from state experiments finds work requirements primarily produce coverage losses through paperwork (existing workers fail to report). They do not measurably increase employment. The framework opposes for this reason.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Make scheduled Medicaid DSH cuts permanent

+$65B +0.017% of GDP / yr

Finalize the disproportionate-share hospital payment cuts that have been repeatedly delayed by Congress.

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

ACA scheduled major DSH cuts on the assumption that universal coverage would reduce uncompensated care needs. Congress has delayed these cuts annually. Making them permanent aligns policy with the ACA's original design.

Counter-argument

Hospitals serving low-income populations argue uncompensated care remains substantial and DSH cuts would force closures.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Healthcare

Reduce ACA marketplace subsidies for higher income brackets

+$180B +0.047% of GDP / yr

Return ACA premium tax credit structure to pre-IRA design, ending the 400-percent-of-poverty cliff fix and reducing subsidies for higher-income marketplace participants.

Right
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The 2021 American Rescue Plan and 2022 IRA expanded ACA subsidies. The expansions are set to expire and Congress has repeatedly extended them. Letting them expire saves substantial money but increases premiums for middle-income marketplace participants.

Counter-argument

ACA enrollment has roughly doubled since the expanded subsidies. Expiration would produce significant coverage losses or premium spikes for the affected population.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Freeze CHIP enhanced federal match

+$30B +0.008% of GDP / yr

Maintain rather than expand the enhanced federal matching rate for state Children's Health Insurance Program funding.

Non-ideological Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

CHIP receives an enhanced federal match relative to regular Medicaid. Freezing rather than expanding this provides modest savings.

Counter-argument

CHIP covers low-income children; reductions are politically difficult.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on CHIP funding history

Healthcare regulatory

PBM structural separation and rebate pass-through

+$100B +0.026% of GDP / yr

Mandatory pass-through of pharmaceutical rebates, prohibition of spread pricing, and structural separation of pharmacy benefit managers from health insurers above a defined size.

In framework Non-ideological Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The three largest PBMs (CVS Caremark, Express Scripts, OptumRx) are each owned by a major health insurer. The FTC's 2024 investigation documented systematic extraction of margin throughout the drug supply chain. Structural separation and rebate transparency are bipartisan reform proposals.

Counter-argument

Health insurers argue PBM integration produces efficiency gains in formulary management. The FTC investigation generally rejected this argument.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on framework Chapter 3 and FTC reports

Defense

Reduce military personnel 17 percent by 2034

+$1.15T +0.297% of GDP / yr

Reduce active-duty military personnel by 17 percent by 2034, either through across-the-board reduction or restructuring of combat units.

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The largest single CBO discretionary option. Implies a significantly smaller standing force and greater reliance on allies for ground operations.

Counter-argument

Defense advocates argue capability cuts harm strategic posture, especially given Russia-China-Iran-DPRK challenges. The framework prefers procurement reform and force-structure redirection rather than aggregate personnel cuts.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Slow military pay increases by 0.5 points

+$20B +0.005% of GDP / yr

Reduce automatic military pay increases by 0.5 percentage points per year through 2030.

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

A modest brake on military pay growth. Reduces career attractiveness at the margin.

Counter-argument

Recruiting and retention are already challenged. Pay reductions worsen the problem.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Retire F-22 fleet in 2026

+$30B +0.008% of GDP / yr

Retire the entire F-22 Raptor stealth fighter fleet in 2026.

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The F-22 is an air-superiority fighter that has had limited combat utility against current threats. Retirement saves on maintenance and pilot costs.

Counter-argument

Air Force opposes; views F-22 as critical for high-end air superiority.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Stop building Ford-class aircraft carriers in 2030

+$20B +0.005% of GDP / yr

Cancel planned Ford-class carrier procurement after the currently authorized vessels.

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Carriers are increasingly vulnerable to long-range anti-ship missiles. The Navy's own studies project diminishing carrier utility against peer competitors.

Counter-argument

Carrier defense lobby is powerful. Allied posture also depends partly on visible carrier presence.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Nondefense discretionary

Reduce transportation and education grants by one-third

+$390B +0.101% of GDP / yr

Cut federal grants to state and local governments for transportation and education by one-third.

Right
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Federal grants subsidize state activities the federal government would otherwise not directly fund. A one-third cut returns more responsibility to states.

Counter-argument

Significant disruption to state transportation and education budgets, particularly in lower-income states that depend more on federal funding. The framework opposes blanket cuts but supports targeted reform of poorly performing programs.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Restrict Pell Grants to max-award-eligible students

+$35B +0.009% of GDP / yr

Limit Pell Grant eligibility to students whose family financial situation qualifies them for the maximum Pell award.

Right
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Pell Grants currently scale with family income. Restricting to maximum-award students concentrates aid on the lowest-income recipients but eliminates partial awards for working-class families.

Counter-argument

Many students rely on partial Pell awards to attend college. Cutting them would reduce college access for the lower middle class.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Repeal Davis-Bacon prevailing wage requirement

+$20B +0.005% of GDP / yr

Repeal the Davis-Bacon Act, which requires federally funded construction projects to pay locally prevailing wages.

Right
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Davis-Bacon dates to 1931. Critics argue it inflates federal construction costs without significant offsetting benefits. Defenders argue it prevents the federal government from undercutting local labor markets.

Counter-argument

Building trades unions strongly oppose. The framework treats this as low-priority both because savings are small and because labor-market concerns are real.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Eliminate AmeriCorps and SeniorCorps

+$10B +0.003% of GDP / yr

End federal funding for the Corporation for National and Community Service programs.

Right
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

AmeriCorps places volunteers in service positions; SeniorCorps does the same for older Americans. Small spending; small savings.

Counter-argument

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

International affairs

Cut international affairs spending by 25 percent

+$215B +0.056% of GDP / yr

Reduce State Department, USAID, and related international affairs spending by 25 percent.

Right
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

International affairs spending is roughly 1 percent of the federal budget. A 25 percent cut produces meaningful savings but represents a substantial shift in US foreign policy posture.

Counter-argument

Foreign aid has well-documented strategic benefits at relatively low cost. The framework supports strategic foreign engagement and views aid reductions as poor leverage on the deficit.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Veterans

Disenroll Priority Groups 7 and 8 from VA care

+$35B +0.009% of GDP / yr

End VA medical care enrollment for veterans in Priority Groups 7 and 8 (higher incomes, no service-connected disabilities).

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

VA priority groups 7 and 8 are veterans without service-connected disabilities and with above-defined-threshold incomes. Roughly 1 million veterans in these groups currently use VA care.

Counter-argument

Veterans' service organizations strongly oppose any narrowing of VA eligibility.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Means-test VA disability compensation above $135K

+$440B +0.114% of GDP / yr

Phase out VA disability compensation for veterans with annual household income above $135,000 (approximately the top 30 percent of veteran households).

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

VA disability compensation is currently provided regardless of household income. Means-testing concentrates benefits on lower-income veterans and produces substantial savings.

Counter-argument

VSOs argue disability compensation is earned through service injury, not means-tested transfer. Means-testing changes the program's character fundamentally.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Agriculture

Reduce federal share of crop insurance premiums to 40 percent

+$35B +0.009% of GDP / yr

Cut the federal share of crop insurance premiums from the current roughly 60 percent average to 40 percent.

In framework Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Federal crop insurance is heavily subsidized to encourage participation. The framework supports reduction of mature agricultural subsidies that lack continuing public-policy justification.

Counter-argument

Farm-state political opposition is strong. Farmers argue insurance maintains domestic food production capacity.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Other mandatory

Use chained CPI for non-Social Security mandatory programs

+$90B +0.023% of GDP / yr

Apply chained CPI to all non-Social Security inflation adjustments (federal pensions, veterans' programs, civilian pay caps, tax bracket indexing already in tax code).

In framework Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Chained CPI is a more accurate inflation measure. Applying it government-wide produces modest savings and more accurate adjustments.

Counter-argument

Federal retirees and veterans' groups oppose any change that reduces real benefit growth.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Federal workforce

Convert federal employee health benefits to voucher

+$45B +0.012% of GDP / yr

Replace the current federal employee health benefits (FEHB) plan structure with a voucher indexed to CPI-U.

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

FEHB currently pays roughly 72 percent of premiums regardless of plan cost growth. A voucher indexed to CPI-U shifts cost growth above CPI to employees.

Counter-argument

Federal employees argue the FEHB structure is part of their compensation package. Real benefit erosion follows.

Source: CBO Options 2025-2034

Structural reforms 0 of 7 on $0B

Reforms that compound through the economy rather than scoring directly on the budget line. Growth contributions and the sovereign wealth fund both live here.

Immigration

Triple H-1B cap, automatic green cards for STEM PhDs

+$600B +0.156% of GDP / yr

Triple the annual H-1B visa cap, provide automatic green cards to STEM PhDs from US universities, create a startup founder visa, and eliminate per-country green card caps.

In framework Non-ideological Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Immigrants founded roughly half of major American tech companies. The current H-1B system rejects 75 percent of applicants through random selection, and green card waits for Indian and Chinese applicants exceed a decade. Skilled immigration is among the highest-return policy interventions available. CBO's 2013 comprehensive reform scoring estimated significant deficit reduction from increased skilled immigration.

Counter-argument

Native wage suppression in directly competing occupations is real but modest and concentrated among the most credentialed workers. Brain drain from developing countries is a concern, though remittances and circular migration partially offset.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on framework Chapter 11 and CBO comprehensive immigration reform scoring

Housing supply

Federal preemption of restrictive local zoning

+$380B +0.099% of GDP / yr

Conditional federal preemption tied to transportation and infrastructure funding, requiring metropolitan areas to permit missing-middle housing types (duplexes, triplexes, ADUs) by right near transit and job centers.

In framework Non-ideological Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Restrictive local zoning suppresses housing supply in high-productivity metros. Hsieh and Moretti estimated misallocation costs at roughly 9 percent of US output, though subsequent research has revised this downward. Even modest output gains translate to substantial federal revenue through income tax and growth in tax base.

Counter-argument

Federalism concerns are real: zoning is traditionally local. The framework's conditional-preemption design (tied to federal funding) borrows from the legal architecture of the federal drinking age. Implementation lag is significant: zoning reform takes years to produce visible construction.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on framework Chapter 2 (Hsieh-Moretti 9% output estimate is upper bound)

Permitting reform

NEPA review caps (2 years, 300-page EIS limits)

+$120B +0.031% of GDP / yr

Statutory caps on NEPA environmental review: 2-year completion deadline, 300-page environmental impact statement limit, elimination of redundant state review for federally permitted projects.

In framework Non-ideological Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Federal environmental reviews now average over 4 years for major projects. The Department of Energy has demonstrated that 300-page EIS limits produce better analysis than the current 1,000-page average. Faster permitting compounds across energy, housing, and infrastructure.

Counter-argument

Environmental advocates argue procedural review is the principal mechanism for accountability on major projects. The framework's response is that page limits and time caps constrain procedural exhaustiveness without weakening substantive review.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on framework Chapter 1 and DOE pilot results

Energy

Nuclear and clean energy permitting reform

+$100B +0.026% of GDP / yr

Standardized NRC design certifications, statutory permitting deadlines, expanded federal transmission siting authority for interregional lines.

In framework Non-ideological Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

DOE estimates that improved transmission siting alone could reduce wholesale electricity prices by 10-15 percent in constrained regions. Cheaper electricity compounds through industrial competitiveness and consumer welfare.

Counter-argument

Nuclear's track record on cost and schedule remains poor. Local opposition to transmission lines is intense. The framework views these as solvable design problems rather than fundamental obstacles.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on framework Chapter 4 and DOE wholesale price studies

Sovereign wealth fund

National Heritage Fund (sovereign wealth fund)

$-700B -0.182% of GDP / yr

Establish an independent federal sovereign wealth fund, capitalized from federal mineral royalties, spectrum auction proceeds, asset sales, a defined share of corporate tax revenue above baseline, and AI windfall taxation. Independent governance modeled on Norway's GPFG. Distributions begin after the fund reaches a defined size.

In framework Non-ideological Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The fund treats currently-consumed revenue (royalties, spectrum, asset sales) as capital rather than operating income. Annual funding of roughly $50-100 billion in early years grows to $2.5 trillion in 20 years and $5+ trillion in 30 years under conservative return assumptions. Distributions can take the form of a citizen's dividend, Social Security supplement, or infrastructure capital. The negative 10-year fiscal effect reflects capitalization; long-term effect is positive.

Counter-argument

Critics argue the funds should pay down debt instead. The framework's response is that the funding sources are currently consumed rather than redirected from debt reduction, and the intergenerational equity case is stronger than the marginal debt-reduction case at these magnitudes.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on framework Chapter 9

Innovation policy

Operation Warp Speed for advanced nuclear, AI safety, longevity, biotech, semiconductors

$-625B -0.162% of GDP / yr

$50-75 billion annually in coordinated federal investment with procurement commitments across five priority frontier technologies.

In framework Non-ideological Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Modeled on the original Operation Warp Speed COVID vaccine effort: federal procurement commitments and milestone-based funding that accelerate technological frontiers with high social returns. The framework views this as an investment, not consumption: long-run returns through productivity growth.

Counter-argument

Picking winners is risky. Federal execution capacity for five simultaneous programs is unproven. The framework's response is that the state capacity reforms in Chapter 1 address execution, and the framework defines frontiers rather than firms.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on framework Chapter 10

Healthcare architecture

Singapore-style healthcare architectural reset

+$800B +0.208% of GDP / yr

Mandatory health savings accounts replacing employer-sponsored insurance for routine expenses, universal catastrophic coverage as a federal program, aggressive price transparency, prohibition of payer-based price discrimination, and reference pricing for branded drugs.

In framework Non-ideological Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Singapore spends roughly 4-5 percent of GDP on healthcare for outcomes that match or exceed US life expectancy. The framework adapts the Singaporean architecture: HSAs build savings over the working life, universal catastrophic coverage prevents medical bankruptcy, price transparency drives competition, and reference pricing controls drug spending. Total federal savings from system reform are uncertain but potentially several percent of GDP within a decade.

Counter-argument

Single-payer advocates argue HSAs preserve administrative complexity. Incumbent insurers and providers oppose. Patient advocates worry about underuse of necessary care due to cost-sharing. The framework's response is layered: preventive and chronic care are exempt from cost-sharing, low-income protections are built in, and the savings come from administrative simplification and price-transparency-driven competition, not from undertreatment.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on framework Chapter 8

Transfer expansions 0 of 4 on $0B

New federal transfers. These reduce the deficit-closing balance and are flagged as a separate category so you can see the net effect of the framework's family and welfare proposals.

Family policy

Refundable child tax credit of $5,000 per child

$-1.50T -0.390% of GDP / yr

Establish a $5,000 per child, fully refundable, monthly-paid child tax credit. Phases out only at very high income levels.

In framework Non-ideological Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Consolidates and dramatically expands the current $2,000 CTC. Addresses both child-poverty and below-replacement fertility concerns. Republican policy proposals (Romney Family Security Act, J.D. Vance pre-VP positions) have endorsed similar designs.

Counter-argument

Cost is significant. Critics argue child allowances reduce labor force participation among second earners, though the 2021 expanded CTC experience showed minimal employment effect.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on framework Chapter 12 and CBO scoring of similar proposals

Federal 12-week paid family leave at 70 percent wage replacement

$-300B -0.078% of GDP / yr

Establish a federal paid family leave program, 12 weeks at approximately 70 percent wage replacement, financed by a small payroll tax addition. Universal coverage regardless of employer.

In framework Non-ideological Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Approximately 75 percent of US workers currently lack paid family leave. Every other wealthy democracy has a national program. Self-financing via payroll tax addition makes the net fiscal cost small.

Counter-argument

Conservative concerns about federal mandate on employers; the framework's payroll-tax-financed social-insurance design largely addresses these. Cost depends on take-up assumptions.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on framework Chapter 12 and CBO scoring

Universal pre-K for ages 3-4

$-350B -0.091% of GDP / yr

Federal grants to states for universal pre-K coverage of children ages 3 and 4, with cost-sharing.

In framework Non-ideological Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Universal pre-K reduces childcare burden, supports parental labor force participation, and produces measurable educational benefits. The framework pairs it with the expanded CTC so that stay-at-home parents are also supported.

Counter-argument

Some research finds the educational benefits of public pre-K fade out in elementary school. Critics also note this incentivizes a dual-income household structure.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on framework Chapter 12

Welfare reform

Negative income tax replacing SNAP, EITC, CTC, vouchers

$-800B -0.208% of GDP / yr

Consolidate SNAP, EITC, Child Tax Credit, Housing Choice Vouchers, LIHEAP, TANF, and several other transfers into a unified cash transfer through the tax system. Approximately $12,000 baseline for a single adult, scaled for household, phasing out at 20-30 percent above earned income.

In framework Non-ideological Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The framework argues the current patchwork of means-tested transfers produces effective marginal tax rates exceeding 80 percent for low-income workers as benefits phase out. A unified NIT with a 20-30 percent phase-out preserves much stronger work incentives while consolidating administrative overhead. Net cost is the difference between expanded coverage and savings from program consolidation.

Counter-argument

Progressives worry about loss of in-kind support (food, housing) and political durability of cash transfers. Conservatives worry about work incentives and dependency. The framework's response cites the Earned Income Tax Credit experience: cash transfers conditioned on work have proven durable and effective.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on framework Chapter 13

Fun to think about 0 of 15 on $0B

Proposals people talk about where the math diverges sharply from intuition. Some cuts disappoint (foreign aid, public broadcasting, the penny). Some big swings go the wrong direction (halting immigration actually expands the deficit). Some popular tax raises raise less than people think (the Eisenhower 91 percent rate; wealth taxes). These are NOT part of any serious framework. Sources are cited where available; many figures are illustrative. Toggle them and watch what happens.

Popular cuts that disappoint

Eliminate SNAP (food stamps) entirely

+$1.20T +0.312% of GDP / yr

Zero out the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, which currently provides food benefits to about 41 million Americans.

Right Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

SNAP outlays were roughly $112 billion in fiscal year 2024, down from a pandemic peak. Elimination would close a meaningful share of the deficit on paper. Many critics across the political spectrum view SNAP as poorly designed (benefits cliffs, retailer eligibility rules, work requirement complications) rather than as something to eliminate; the framework's negative income tax is one such alternative.

Counter-argument

About 41 million people, roughly half of them children, would lose food assistance. Downstream effects include increased Medicaid spending from worse health outcomes, ER visits for malnutrition-adjacent conditions, and a spike in food bank demand that no private network can absorb. The political coalition for elimination has never held, even during peak fiscal-conservative governance. Empirical research consistently finds that SNAP recipients are not measurably distorted from work in ways that meaningfully affect aggregate labor supply.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on USDA Food and Nutrition Service FY2024 SNAP outlays

Eliminate the National School Lunch and Breakfast Programs

+$250B +0.065% of GDP / yr

End federal subsidies for free and reduced-price meals at schools, which currently serve roughly 30 million children.

Right Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

NSLP and SBP combined cost roughly $25 billion per year. Critics sometimes cite school lunch as an example of bloated federal spending; the actual budget impact is about 0.07 percent of GDP. The program operates as a federal subsidy paired with state and district administration.

Counter-argument

Roughly 30 million children, disproportionately from low-income households, would lose subsidized meals. Research consistently finds these programs measurably improve school attendance, test scores, and long-run earnings. The fiscal savings are too small to move the deficit; the human capital effects, capitalized over the lifetime of the affected cohort, are large.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on USDA Food and Nutrition Service FY2024 NSLP and SBP outlays

Eliminate all foreign aid

+$550B +0.143% of GDP / yr

End all USAID grants, State Department aid, Millennium Challenge Corporation, PEPFAR, and other bilateral foreign assistance.

Right
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Total US foreign assistance was roughly $55 billion in fiscal year 2023. Polling routinely finds Americans estimate the share of the federal budget devoted to foreign aid at 25 percent; the actual share is about 1 percent. Elimination saves roughly $550 billion over 10 years.

Counter-argument

Foreign assistance is one of the highest-leverage uses of federal spending. PEPFAR alone has saved more than 25 million lives at a cost of $120 billion since 2003, at a cost per life saved that compares favorably to most public health interventions. Eliminating aid also weakens diplomatic leverage and creates space for adversary influence; China's Belt and Road Initiative has filled exactly the gaps left by US retrenchment over the past decade. The deficit benefit is real but small relative to the geopolitical cost.

Source: ForeignAssistance.gov FY2024 obligations

Defund the Corporation for Public Broadcasting

+$5B +0.001% of GDP / yr

Zero out federal funding for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, which supports NPR, PBS, and local stations.

Right
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

CPB receives roughly $535 million per year in federal appropriation. That is approximately 0.012 percent of federal spending. Defunding CPB is a recurring talking point but the deficit math is essentially zero.

Counter-argument

Federal CPB funding is a small share of NPR and PBS budgets nationally (about 8 percent for NPR member stations on average), but it is a much larger share for rural and low-density-market stations, many of which would close. Whether public media should be federally funded is a real debate. The deficit math is essentially zero either way.

Source: CPB FY2024 federal appropriation

Abolish the Department of Education

+$250B +0.065% of GDP / yr

Eliminate the Department of Education. Pell Grants and federal student loans transfer to Treasury; civil rights enforcement transfers to DOJ.

Right Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Department of Education discretionary spending is about $80 billion per year, but roughly half is Pell Grants and Title I (low-income schools) that continue in any plausible reform. Net administrative savings from elimination are perhaps $20 to $25 billion per year.

Counter-argument

The Department was created in 1979; before that, education functions were spread across the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Elimination requires Congress to decide which functions transfer where, which has been the actual reason no proposal to abolish has ever advanced past introduction. Pell, FAFSA processing, civil rights enforcement, IDEA administration, and statistical reporting all have to live somewhere; the savings come only from removing the cabinet-level overhead, which is small.

Source: Illustrative estimate; Department of Education FY2025 budget

Eliminate the penny and nickel

+$1B +0.000% of GDP / yr

Discontinue production of one-cent and five-cent coins, which currently cost more to manufacture than their face value.

Non-ideological
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The Mint loses roughly $90 million per year producing pennies (a one-cent coin currently costs about 3 cents to manufacture) and roughly $50 million per year on nickels. Discontinuing both saves about $140 million per year, or $1.4 billion over a decade.

Counter-argument

Bills to discontinue the penny have been introduced for decades. The case is straightforward: every other developed country has rounded its smallest coin out of circulation, and Canada eliminated the penny in 2013 without measurable consumer issues. The zinc industry lobby is the principal obstacle. The deficit math is microscopic but the policy is genuinely correct on its merits.

Source: US Mint annual report

Popular tax raises

Top marginal income tax rate of 70 percent above $10M

+$800B +0.208% of GDP / yr

Add a new top tax bracket at 70 percent on annual income above $10 million (the AOC 2019 proposal).

Left Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Modeled on Rep. Ocasio-Cortez's 2019 proposal. The top 0.1 percent of households received roughly $1.6 trillion in income in 2022, much of which is currently taxed at preferential capital gains rates. Static revenue would be larger than the figure here; the estimate reflects behavioral response and income-shifting.

Counter-argument

Empirical work suggests behavioral response is meaningful at very high marginal rates. Top earners shift income to capital gains, foreign jurisdictions, deferred compensation, and structured forms that escape ordinary rates. The Diamond-Saez literature on optimal top rates points to roughly 70 to 80 percent in theory, but the practical revenue depends on which income types are also reformed (capital gains, carried interest, step-up basis). Without those, a 70 percent statutory rate produces much less than 70 percent effective.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on Tax Policy Center and Penn-Wharton Budget Model analyses

Top marginal rate of 91 percent (Eisenhower era)

+$1.50T +0.390% of GDP / yr

Restore the top marginal income tax rate to 91 percent, the post-WWII rate that held from 1946 through 1963.

Left Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The 91 percent top bracket held from 1946 through 1963 on income above roughly $200,000 (about $2 million in today's dollars). Effective rates on top earners were nowhere near 91 percent because of much more aggressive deductions and shelters, but the statutory rate is what gets quoted in popular debate.

Counter-argument

The same caveats as the 70 percent option apply, more strongly. The 1950s top bracket coexisted with vastly more available shelters: oil depletion allowances, capital gains carve-outs, tax-free municipal bonds, and complex partnership structures. Restoring 91 percent without restoring the shelters is a different policy than 'returning to the Eisenhower era,' and would produce far more behavioral response than the historical statutory rate did. Effective rates on top earners in the 1950s averaged about 42 percent, not 91 percent.

Source: Illustrative estimate; historical context from Tax Foundation

Wealth tax: 2 percent over $50M, 3 percent over $1B

+$1.50T +0.390% of GDP / yr

Annual tax on net worth above $50 million, with a higher rate above $1 billion (the Warren 2020 proposal).

Left Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The proposal would create the first US tax on net worth above wages and asset income. Saez and Zucman estimated $2.75 trillion over 10 years assuming low evasion. Penn-Wharton's range of $1.0 to $2.7 trillion reflects sensitivity to evasion and valuation assumptions. The midpoint estimate here splits the difference.

Counter-argument

Wealth taxes face four large practical problems. Valuation: how do you appraise a private business or a privately held art collection every year? Liquidity: a billionaire whose net worth is mostly illiquid stock cannot necessarily generate cash to pay 3 percent. Avoidance: France's wealth tax raised less than half its projected revenue before France repealed it in 2018; the same happened in Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands. Constitutional: the federal government may lack the authority to impose direct taxes other than income (16th Amendment); the Moore v. United States 2024 ruling left this ambiguous.

Source: Illustrative estimate; Saez and Zucman 2019 estimated $2.75 trillion, Penn-Wharton estimated $1.0 to $2.7 trillion

Billionaire mark-to-market income tax

+$550B +0.143% of GDP / yr

Annual tax on unrealized capital gains for individuals with net worth above $1 billion (the Wyden 2021 proposal).

Left Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Targets roughly 700 households. Mark-to-market treats unrealized gains in publicly traded securities as annual income; illiquid asset gains accrue and are paid on sale with an interest charge for the deferral period.

Counter-argument

The constitutional question (whether taxing unrealized gain counts as taxing 'income') was left ambiguous by Moore v. United States 2024. The valuation problem for illiquid assets is real and was the principal critique by JCT. The base is so narrow (700 households) that any meaningful restructuring by even a handful of them moves the revenue materially. The proposal has never gotten a serious markup despite a Senate Finance Committee chairman sponsoring it for four years.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on JCT scoring of Sen. Wyden's Billionaires Income Tax Act

Tax religious organizations as for-profit entities

+$700B +0.182% of GDP / yr

Eliminate the federal tax exemption for churches, synagogues, mosques, and religious organizations.

Left Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

Religious organizations are exempt from federal income tax, donor deductibility flows through Section 170, and a number of payroll tax provisions are favorable. State and local property tax exemptions are even larger but outside federal scoring. The Cragun et al. 2012 estimate of $71 billion per year was widely cited; the federal share might be $30 to $80 billion. The midpoint figure here is illustrative.

Counter-argument

First Amendment Establishment Clause issues have killed every serious proposal. The administrative complexity of distinguishing religious activity from social-service activity (a church-run food bank, a religious hospital) is also substantial. Several countries (Germany, Italy, Denmark) tax churches via opt-in church taxes; the operational lessons are not encouraging. Aggressive enforcement would also produce political backlash far disproportionate to the revenue.

Source: Illustrative estimate; Cragun et al. 2012 University of Tampa study estimated combined federal/state/local exemptions at $71 billion per year

Big swings

Halt all immigration to zero net migration

$-1.20T -0.312% of GDP / yr

Suspend all new immigration (legal and unauthorized) so net annual migration is zero. Existing residents stay.

Right Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

CBO's baseline economic and fiscal projections assume net immigration of roughly 1 million people per year. Removing that flow reduces GDP growth, payroll tax receipts, and income tax receipts. The Social Security and Medicare Trustees project that further reductions in net immigration accelerate trust fund insolvency by 2 to 4 years.

Counter-argument

Stopping immigration is the rare 'fiscal' lever that actually expands the deficit. Immigrants pay more in payroll taxes than they collect in benefits in the short and medium run, and they enter the economy as workers but exit it as retirees decades later. Halting immigration removes the worker flow without removing the future-retiree obligations. The framework supports tripling skilled immigration in part because the fiscal math runs the opposite direction from popular intuition.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on CBO immigration baseline projections and Social Security Trustees demographic analysis

Mass deport all undocumented residents

$-800B -0.208% of GDP / yr

Federal program to remove an estimated 11 million undocumented residents over four years.

Right Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

The American Action Forum estimates direct enforcement costs of $200 to $500 billion for a multi-year program, plus annual GDP losses of 1.0 to 1.4 percent from labor force reduction, plus reduced payroll tax receipts of roughly $20 billion per year from a worker population that pays taxes but cannot draw benefits. Cato Institute estimates are higher.

Counter-argument

Deportation is a net fiscal cost, not a saving. Undocumented immigrants pay roughly $20 to $30 billion per year in payroll taxes that they will never collect against (no Social Security or Medicare eligibility under current law). They also pay sales tax and, indirectly through landlords, property tax. The enforcement infrastructure itself is enormously expensive; ICE's current annual deportation rate, fully scaled, would take roughly four decades to clear the population. Compressing into four years is multiple multiples of current capacity.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on AAF and Cato Institute deportation cost analyses

Sell Bureau of Land Management federal lands

+$650B +0.169% of GDP / yr

Auction or sell the approximately 245 million acres managed by BLM, excluding national parks and wilderness areas.

Right Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

BLM manages roughly 245 million acres, mostly in 12 Western states. At an average sale price of $3,000 per acre, gross proceeds would be about $735 billion. Ongoing royalty and grazing-fee revenue (roughly $5 billion per year) would be lost, so net 10-year fiscal effect is roughly $650 billion. The actual average price is a heroic assumption; a mass sale would depress it.

Counter-argument

Land values vary enormously. Parcels near growing metros sell for tens of thousands per acre, remote desert parcels for a few hundred. A mass federal sale would crash the market. More importantly, BLM lands provide grazing, recreation, mineral rights, and ecosystem services to states (especially Wyoming, Nevada, Idaho, Utah, Montana) that politically would not accept the loss. Federal land transfers have been politically explosive since the 1880s. The deficit benefit is real but one-time.

Source: Illustrative estimate; BLM acreage from Bureau of Land Management

Universal Basic Income of $1,000 per month for every adult

$-29.00T -7.500% of GDP / yr

Send $12,000 per year to every adult US citizen, regardless of income or work status.

Left Illustrative estimate
Your annual change:
Why this matters
Rationale

There are approximately 258 million adult US citizens. A $12,000 annual payment to each is roughly $3.1 trillion per year. Over a decade, with population growth, the gross cost is about $33 trillion. Net cost depends on the design: some proposals replace SNAP, EITC, and TANF, saving roughly $1 to $2 trillion. Even after offsets, the net 10-year fiscal expansion is the largest item on this whole site.

Counter-argument

The fiscal magnitude is so large that UBI proposals almost always include offsetting tax increases that are themselves politically harder than the UBI is popular. Andrew Yang's 2020 proposal funded with a 10 percent value-added tax; even with that VAT it would still have produced a multi-trillion deficit increase. The framework's negative income tax in Chapter 13 captures most of the policy intent (universal floor, simplified administration) at roughly one-twentieth the cost, by phasing out with earned income rather than paying everyone.

Source: Illustrative estimate based on Tax Foundation analysis of Andrew Yang 2020 proposal

Your plan in three views

Composition

Revenue, spending, structural, and transfer components of your 10-year package.

Debt-to-GDP, 30-year projection

CBO baseline versus your plan, 2026 through 2056. A simplified projection.

By category

Share of net adjustment coming from each category (deficit-reducing levers only).

Compare your plan to alternatives

Side-by-side with three reference plans. Click any heading to load it in the balancer.

About the math

Ten-year totals are summed directly across selected levers. The percent-of-GDP figure divides by cumulative projected GDP of roughly $384 trillion over the FY2026 to FY2035 window. The 30-year debt trajectory uses the standard accounting identity: next-year debt-to-GDP equals (current debt-to-GDP plus deficit-to-GDP) divided by one plus nominal GDP growth, with growth pegged at 3.8 percent. CBO baseline deficits are interpolated between published values and extrapolated to 2056 following the long-term outlook trajectory.

Some default-on levers overlap in their tax base or savings stream. A serious score-out would haircut these because they interact. The playground treats lever effects as additive for simplicity. See the methodology page for details and full source list.

The personal impact lines under each lever show one of two things: a direct change (when you would actually pay or receive the money, such as a marginal rate change or expanded CTC) or a tax burden share (when you would not be directly affected, such as SNAP elimination or defense cuts). The share is your proportional slice of the lever's annual macro effect, weighted by your share of total federal revenue. It is a counterfactual: it represents what the lever would mean for your taxes if every dollar of macro effect were rebated proportionally to current federal tax burden. Your share is computed using your federal income tax, capital gains tax, NIIT, payroll taxes, and the current child tax credit. Levers with a "share" badge use this view; levers without the badge use a directly modeled effect.